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BUDGETING AND RATIONING IN THE
GERMAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
Heidi Nadolski
It is the contention of this presentation that the budget system of the
German health care system supports hidden rationing.
I. OBJECTIVE AND REALITY OF THE GERMAN
HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
All citizens should enjoy ready access to comprehensive, high quality
medical care no matter what their age, sex, marital status, income or indi-
vidual health risks. Beneficiaries should receive sufficient, necessary, use-
ful and affordable care.
However, the reality is that equal access is not guaranteed and not
every patient receives the best possible medical care. Therefore, rationing
is a fact of life.
II. THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN GERMANY
Almost ninety-nine percent of the German population has health insur-
ance. Almost ninety percent are insured by one of the 541 statutory health
insurance funds (SHI-funds) and nine percent have private insurance.
The Fifth Book of the Social Security Code, part of Federal Law, gov-
erns the health care system. The German social security system is based on
several principles.
FIRST IS SOLIDARITY
Solidarity means that the economically stronger members of society
support the weaker members. Meaning those with higher incomes pay for
those with lower incomes. Those who are employed pay for those who are
not yet or no longer employed. Those who are young and healthy pay for
those who are old and ill. Those who are single and childless pay for those
with families.
Solidarity also means that contributions should increase with the ability
to pay.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 18:697
THE SECOND BASIS FOR THE GERMAN SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM IS
CONTRIBUTION FINANCING
All employees or retirees earning less than the statutorily prescribed
ceiling of 6,525 deutsch marks per month must join a SHI-fund. A person
earning more than the ceiling may join a private sickness fund. The com-
bined premiums of the members of one sickness fund corresponds to the
total service demand by the community of persons being enrolled in that
particular fund. Contributions to these funds are paid from salary based
employee and employer pay-roll deductions, split equally between the
two. Now the average contribution rate is 13.6 percent.
THE THIRD BASIS IS COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE
The SHI-benefit catalogue covers a broad range of services provided by
the SHI-funds. These funds cover preventive care, curative services, sup-
ply of drugs, remedies and medical supplies, hospital treatment and reha-
bilitation.
SHI physicians provide ambulatory care, prescribe drugs and medical
appliances and decide who is to be hospitalized. Patients have free choice
of all SHI doctors and dentists.
THE FOURTH AND FINAL BASIS IS GERMAN SELF-GOVERNANCY
The system is characterized by the close cooperation of the SHI funds,
the association of physicians, the association of hospitals and other suppli-
ers. Funding and providing health services are two different processes. The
government enacts laws, issues guidelines for the organization of health
care and then leaves it to non-governmental institutions to manage the
health services. As a result, government agencies are not involved in the
SHI system.
III. HEALTH CARE IN GERMANY UNDER A BUDGET
SYSTEM
Germany has limited resources to treat its eighty million citizens. In
1998, Germany spent 10.9 percent of its Gross Domestic Product on
health, compared to the 13.6 percent that was spent in the United States.
Expenditure on public health is largely financed by the statutory health
insurance system.
Due to the rapid rise in health care expenditure in Germany, a number
of cost-containment efforts have been made since 1977 with a high degree
of state intervention. The aim of these health care reforms is to bring the
growth of expenditure in line with the growth of wages and salaries of the
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fund members. Because the German health care system is mostly financed
by employers and employees through payroll deductions, a rise in the
monthly contribution rate leads to higher wage costs that harm the com-
petitiveness of the German economy.
An important element of the most recent Health Care Reform ("GKV-
Solidaritdtsstirkungsgesetz") was the introduction of a fixed budget,
which limited the amount of money coming into the SHI system. In 1999,
the SHI system spent 240 billion deutsch marks (108 billion .dollars).
Within the global budget, politicians earmark the amounts for various sec-
tors such as ambulatory care, hospitals, drugs and remedies. Ambulatory
care received forty-two billion deutsch marks (nineteen billion dollars) in
1999, while the stationary sector received eighty-six billion deutsch marks
(thirty-nine billion dollars) and the drug and remedy sectors received
thirty-eight billion deutsch marks (seventeen billion dollars). Until now,
the SHI physicians were collectively liable if the cost for drugs and reme-
dies exceeded the budget. Such liability led to compulsory savings and
very cautious prescription behavior.
VI. TYPES OF RATIONING AND EXAMPLES IN GERMANY
Rationing takes place in any system dealing with scarce resources, and
the health care system is no exception. Several different types of rationing
exist in the German system: hard rationing, soft rationing, hidden ration-
ing and open rationing. Under hard rationing, there are natural or statu-
tory limitations of health services with no possibility to obtain them else-
where. Trading organs is an example of hard rationing, because it is illegal
in Germany.
Under soft rationing, an individual may obtain the desired benefits by
taking out an additional private insurance policy. Most benefits not cov-
ered by the SHI fund may nevertheless be self-paid or covered by supple-
mentary private health insurance. For example, some members of the
statutory health insurance system have supplementary private insurance to
cover a senior consultant treatment in the hospital. Another example of
soft rationing is the "expensive dentures treatment." Some Germans travel
to Eastern European countries to get cheaper dentures. Compared to hard
rationing, soft rationing is more widely accepted in society, although it
violates the principle that every person should have the same access to
medical benefits independent of his or her income.
Open rationing means that both the conditions of obtaining a benefit, as
well as, the limitations of the benefit are well known. Contrarily, hidden
rationing means that there is no transparency of the allocation criteria.
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The process of rationing is always a combination of hard/soft and hid-
den/open. For example, the rationing process in palliative medicine in
Germany is hard, as well as, hidden. Individuals may neither purchase ap-
propriate care for patients in pain to fill the deficit of supply of medical
care, nor are they aware of this deficit.
In Germany rationing is mainly hidden, due to the German budgeting
policy, which raises many ethical problems. There are many examples of
hidden rationing in Germany. First, is the extending and postponing of
medical treatment. It is a proven fact that many medical treatments were
either stretched out or postponed to a new budgetary period. Particularly
towards the end of the year, the number of prescriptions decreased
dramatically. For example, the budget allocated to one physician is often
not high enough to pay for the customary ten treatments for the speech
therapy of a child with a speech disorder. Some of these ten treatments
were postponed to the next budgetary period, although this is medically
counterproductive.
Next, is the shortening of medical treatments. For every treatment there
exists. specific time frame recommendations. Due to budgetary restraints,
the duration of treatment often falls short of the recommended time
frame. Whether a treatment is to be shortened or not is a decision made
either by the physician, by the sickness-fund or by the patient (the latter if
the patient is paying for the treatment out of his or her own pocket). For
example, time-consuming services for which the physician is not reim-
bursed, like medical counseling, are reduced to a minimum.
Third is the loss of quality. There is a danger that strict budgets result in
a lower quality of medical care. For example, multiple sclerosis is often
successfully treated with the drug Interferon. The problem is that such an
up-to-date medical treatment costs 30,000 deutsch marks a year (13,500
dollars). Consequently, many patients are treated with sub-optimal, old-
fashioned, yet cheaper drugs. Up-to-date treatment with Interferon is pro-
vided to only twenty percent of multiple sclerosis patients.
In addition, tight budgets in the hospital sector result in an under-
staffing of hospital doctors. The remaining hospital doctors have to work
overtime and currently account for fifty million hours in unpaid overtime.
An individual physician often works more than twenty hours on duty
without a break. This may possibly lead to a decline in medical quality
and an increase in medical errors.
A fourth example is the refusal of treatment. Sickness funds receive
strong pressure to keep their premiums low in order to be competitive.
Therefore, some sickness funds reimburse physicians only very reluctantly.
Patients may appeal to the administration of the sickness-fund, but many
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patients give up and either forego the treatment or pay for it out of their
own pocket. Most of those affected are specific high-risk populations, such
as elderly patients with chronic illnesses that benefit from expensive, but
effective medications. For example, sickness funds consistently refuse to
pay for the physiotherapy necessary for the rehabilitation of stroke pa-
tients.
Also, the providers of medical care will not - or can no longer - provide
their services to all needy patients because they do not receive enough
money. Patients requiring expensive treatments may even be rejected up
front.
In 1999, a sickness-fund paid the psychotherapists in Schleswig-Holstein
only 0.145 deutsch marks (seven cents) for a fifty minute session. In the
long run, this service will probably no longer be offered - or at least cov-
ered.
V. SUMMARY AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
These examples demonstrate that rationing of medical care takes place
in Germany. The objective that all citizens should have ready access to
comprehensive high quality medical care is not met. It is arguable whether
the ideal of a total equality is possible at all. In any economic system with
scarce resources it is never possible to avoid rationing completely, even
when the system is being rationalized. Even when the health care system is
not capped but open, the individual would not spend all of his or her
money on medical care. A perfectly equal distribution of scarce goods is
an illusion. The question remains, however, how to obtain an appropriate
amount for a health care budget.
The new budgeting system in Germany is only economically motivated,
not medically motivated. Expenditures are supposed to rise by the annual
increase of the premiums collected by the sickness funds. The budget in-
creases when the wage-related contribution revenue increases, although
this can hardly be expected due to the high rate of unemployment in Ger-
many. The system guarantees stable contribution rates and is favored by
the government, the SHI funds and the employers. In contrast to them,
physicians demand to arrive at a budget using epidemiological and medical
indications.
Physicians particularly oppose the drug and remedy budget, primarily
because these budgets prescribe collective liability of physicians when the
budget is exceeded, no matter how carefully or wastefully they prescribe.
The new secretary of health has cut back the drug and remedy budget, but
replaced it with a similar restrictive system. Now the intention is to intro-
duce individual budgets by stipulating specialist-related prescription limits.
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If a physician exceeds the prescription limit by more than a certain per-
centage, he or she would have to undergo a utilization review and would
be held liable unless the prescription over the limit could be justified by
practice-specific particularities. This new system does not change the fact
that the provider must decide who receives the drugs.
From an ethical perspective, it is very problematic that the German
budgeting system supports hidden rationing because the people concerned
- the patients and the insured - are excluded from the allocation process.
It would be completely obscure and arbitrary to let health care administra-
tors decide who is to receive treatment, because there are no fixed and
published conditions under which these decisions are made. Third party-
payers are likely to impose limits on expenditure-based criteria which nei-
ther reflect, nor embody the values previously associated with providing
health care and professional service.
In every system with scarce resources rationing is unavoidable, but it
should happen openly. Open rationing means transparency of the alloca-
tion process. The criteria under which the allocation of benefits and ser-
vices takes place must be comprehensible for all, otherwise it is completely
arbitrary whether somebody gets a benefit or not. The aim is that un-
avoidable regulations and limitations are based on medical, economical,
ethical and socio-political criteria, and that patients as well as experts are
involved in the decision making process. Ideally, society should decide
how egalitarian the health care system should be, which health benefits
should be paid according to the solidarity-principle and which groups can
pay benefits out-of-pocket.
One solution of the hidden rationing problem might be to reduce the
SHI benefit catalogue to a basic catalogue in which the most necessary
medical care is guaranteed for every insured citizen. Optional benefits
may be offered additionally by the SHI funds or by private insurance. This
is the subject of much discussion in Germany. Proponents of a more pri-
vatized system argue that it takes a willingness to pay into an account.
Opponents suggest that privatization of the health care system leads to
"two-class-medicine" and to an "Americanization of the conditions". This
discussion is important, because it concerns the appropriateness and the
practicality of the basic elements of the German health care system:
solidarity, contribution financing, comprehensive coverage and self-
governancy. The final aim should be to allocate available resources that
ensure that the citizens get sufficient, necessary, useful and affordable
health care now and in the future.
